Just in case you were inclined to rest easy over the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released a few days ago that announces “with high confidence” that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and could not obtain a nuclear weapon at least until 2010-2015, you might take a look at last Thursday’s op-ed in the NY Times. And you can read this from our skeptical friend, Ami Isseroff. I hope that these doubts are ill-placed, but who can say? I mean that question literally, WHO can say— with a really high level of confidence?
It disturbs me that Israel is almost alone against the world in feeling these doubts, but the rest of the world is not the target of hate that Israel is. I hope the NIE is accurate and that somebody explains this to the Israelis in convincing terms. Besides, do the Israelis have a unilateral military option?
In speaking with us yesterday at the Meretz USA board meeting, Meretz MK Avshalom (Abu) Vilan indicated that Iran has 58 nuclear-related facilities. Laying out the scenario without advocating such action, he sees a sustained air campaign of months, necessitating air forces ten times the size of Israel’s for this purpose. Even stormin’ Norman Podhoretz believes that only the US has the military capacity (via air power) to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities.
And what do you think of the very popular view by a leading Israeli analyst Obadiah Shoher? He argues (here, for example, www. samsonblinded.org/blog/america-arranges-a-peace-deal-with-iran.htm ) that the Bush Administration made a deal with Iran: nuclear program in exchange for curtailing the Iranian support for Iraqi terrorists. His story seems plausible, isn’t it?
Alex:
With some difficulty, I found this blog posting you mention. I’ve never heard of this “leading Israeli analyst Obadiah Shoher.” There’s no real evidence for his assertion that the US has secretly betrayed Israeli security needs by allowing Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for Iran’s help in curtailing the insurgency.
Iran has no influence over Sunni elements (the biggest component of the insurgency); many Sunnis appear to have genuinely made an alliance of convenience with the US to rid themselves of Jihadist domination and the downturn in violence generally appears to be a genuine result of the temporary “surge” of US troops.
Reluctantly, however, I share Shoher’s suspicions that Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions have not been curtailed.